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SECTION 1983 LITIGATION
Martin A. Schwartz

Hon. George C. Pratt
ProfessorMartin A. Schwartz:
Good morning. Thank you, Judge Lazer. Section 1983' is a
vital part of American Law. This is the statute that authorizes
individuals to go into court to seek redress for violations of their
It is
federally protected rights by state and local officials.'
utilized in a very broad range of situations, perhaps most

prominently in police misconduct cases.
Let me list what I think are certainly among the most important
issues regarding Section 1983.' First, what types of federal rights
Second, when is a
are enforceable under Section 1983?
municipality liable for constitutional wrongdoing? Third, when is

an official who has been sued for damages in a personal capacity
protected from liability by the defense of qualified immunity?
Fourth, what is the relationship between the federal Section 1983
remedy and state remedies?
Significantly, the United States Supreme Court rendered
decisions last term dealing with each of these significant issues.
'42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). Section 1983 provides in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any state statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage of any State or Territory or the District
of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injures in an action
at law, suit in equity, or other proceeding for redress. . .
Id.
2 Id.
I See, e.g.,Grahamv. Connor, 390 U.S. 386 (1989) (police use of excessive
force); City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 412 (1989) (holding
inadequate police training may serve as a basis for a § 1983 action); see also
Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386 (1987) (validity of release dismissal agreement).
4 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994); see generally 1A, 1B & IC MARTIN A.
ScHwARTz & JoHN E. KIRKLIN, SEcTION 1983: CLAmis AND DEFENsEs (3d

ed. 1997).
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If one looks at the array of these decisions, they are a mixed bag
in the sense that some of the decisions were pro-plaintiff and
some were pro-defendant.5 This mixture is typical of the
decisions rendered in any term of the Supreme Court over the last
fifteen years or so. But, in my opinion, the most important
Section 1983 rulings from the Supreme Court last term were prodefendant.6 These rulings were in favor of state and local
government, which raises the question of whether the present
Court is perhaps embarked on cutting back on the Section 1983
remedy. I think that is an issue that we will have to watch during
the next several years.
Let me start with the first question, the rights that are
enforceable under Section 1983. Most Section 1983 cases assert
violations of federal constitutional rights. We are familiar with
those cases- Fourth Amendment Rights, 7 First Amendment
rights, 8 Equal Protection, 9 and so forth. But Section 1983 also
authorizes the enforcement of federal statutory rights. 0

In
5 See, e.g., Richardson v. McKnight, 117 S. Ct. 2100 (1997).
Richardson, the Court held that prison guards, who were employed by a
private prison management firm, were not entitled to qualified immunity. Id.
at 2107-08. See also Board of County Commissioners of Bryan County v.
Brown, 117 S.Ct. 1382 (1997). In Brown, the County was not held liable for
an alleged careless hiring decision. Id. at 1394.
6 See, e.g., Brown, 117 S.Ct. at 1382; Blessing v. Freestone, 117 S. Ct.
1353 (1997); McMillian v. Monroe County, 117. S. Ct. 1734 (1997).
' U.S. CONST. amend. IV. This amendment provides in pertinent part:
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated...
Id.
."

S

U.S. CONST. amend. I. This amendment provides: "Congress shall make

no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the
people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances." Id.
9 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. This section provides in pertinent part:
"No State shall make or enforce any law which shall

. . .

deny to any person

within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Id.
1042 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). Section 1983 protects a plaintiff's federally
protected rights by allowing the plaintiff to seek redress in the form of
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The big issue in the Supreme Court over the last few years has
been which federal statutes are in fact enforceable under Section
1983? If one goes back to 1980, the Supreme Court decided
Maine v. Thiboutot.ll The Court held that any federal statute
claimed to be violated by a state or local official is enforceable
under Section 1983.2 But, in later cases, the Supreme Court cut
back on that ruling; subsequent decisions held that there were two
types of federal statutes that are not enforceable under Section
1983.'3 First, there are federal statutes that do not create
enforceable rights, but only declare Congressional policy.' 4
Those statutes are not enforceable under Section 1983." Then
there are federal statutes that have such a comprehensive remedial
scheme that the Supreme Court finding that they evince an
intention that the comprehensive remedies be the exclusive modes
of enforcement, thereby precluding resort to Section 1983.16 It is
a type of implied repeal of the Section 1983 remedy.
damages for an alleged violation of the "laws" of the United States by a state
of local official. Id.
n 448 U.S. 1 (1980).
21d.
I at 4. Respondents brought suit alleging that the State of Maine and its
Commissioner of Human Services violated a federal right by depriving
respondents of welfare benefits under the federal Social Security Act. Id. at 3.
'3See, e.g., Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1
(1981) (holding that a claimed violation of a federal statue is not enforceable
under § 1983 when it confers no substantive rights, but merely constitutes a
congressional declaration of policy); Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v.
National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981) (holding that a claimed
violation of a federal statue is not enforceable when Congress has foreclosed
the § 1983 remedy in the particular statutory scheme).
14See, e.g., Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 18 (finding particular provisions of the
Development Disabled Assistance & Bill of Rights Act did not create
enforceable rights); but see Wright v. Roanoke Redevelopment & Housing
Authority, 479 U.S. 418 (1987). In Wright, the Court held that a federal
regulation may create enforceable rights under § 1983 when the statute itself
has created enforceable rights, when the regulation is within the scope of the
statute and when the regulation was intended to create enforceable rights. Id.
at15
432.
See Schwartz, supra note 4 at § 4.2.
16 See, e.g., Middlesex, 453 U.S. at 18 (finding two environmental statutes
unenforceable under § 1983 because the existence of express remedies
"demonstrate not only that Congress intended to foreclose implied private
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This question of which federal statutes are enforceable under
Section 1983 is quite an important issue. It comes before the
federal courts on a regular basis, and I think it typically presents
very difficult questions, both for litigators who litigate these
claims and for federal judges who have to resolve them.
I say that for a number of reasons. First of all, we are not
dealing with just the Congressional intent with respect to a
particular federal statute. We are dealing with the Congressional
intent concerning the interplay of the federal statute that the
plaintiff is seeking to enforce, and Section 1983. Of course, that
creates difficulties. What did Congress intend with respect to this
interplay of the two statutes? What makes this especially difficult
is that typically, and this understates the matter, Congress did not
actually consider this issue. It enacts federal statutory schemes
without regard to the question of whether the federal statutes are
enforceable under Section 1983. When the issue arises in
litigation, what does the federal court have to decide? What does
the United States Supreme Court have to decide?
The issue comes down to this -- what would Congress have

intended if the Congress had in fact considered the issue? It is a
type of hypothetical inquiry. Because the Supreme Court knows
that there is rarely actual Congressional intent with regard to the
issue, the Court has created a type of analytical framework, a
series of principles and doctrines that help the federal courts to
deal with this issue. They have come up with a series of rules.
For example, for a federal statute to be enforceable under Section
1983, the federal statute has to create rights and binding
obligations;7 it must have been enacted for the benefit of the
plaintiffs who are bringing the lawsuit;" and the federal statute
has to be fairly definite.19

actions but also intended to supplant any remedy that otherwise would be
available under § 1983.").
'7

Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 18.

Wright v. Roanoke Development & Housing Authority, 479 U.S. 418
(1987).
9 Artist M. v. Suter, 503 U.S. 347 (1992).
18
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I think that there is further difficulty in this area stemming from
the fact that United States Supreme Court decisions themselves
have not always run a straight line. There have been some
"relatively broad" pro-plaintiff decisions.o On the other hand,
there have been some decisions that have been rather narrow in
terms of what type of federal statutes are enforceable under
Section 1983.21

This has been a tough area in the Supreme Court and a tough
area for anybody that litigates one of these claims. Last term the
Supreme Court decided a case called Blessing v. Freestone.22 In
that case the Court unanimously ruled 3 that the plaintiffs could
not enforce a federal statutory scheme that is known as Title IVD of the federal Social Security Act. 24 The federal statute at issue
in this case was the child support provisions of the AFDC
Chapter of the Social Security Act. 2s In fact, one of my theories
is that it is very often less exciting Supreme Court decisions that
wind up becoming the most important in the day-to-day practice
of Section 1983 litigation.
Now, what was the issue in this case? This federal statutory
scheme, this Title IV-D, was a federal funding scheme, and it
channeled funds to the states. 26 The funds were channeled to the
states for the purpose of having them make efforts to establish

21 See, e.g., Johnson v. Fankell, 117 S. Ct. 1800 (1997) (holding officials
had no right to interlocutory appeal in state court when denied qualified

immunity).

See Blessing v. Freestone, 117 S. Ct. 1353, 1354 (1997) (holding that the
plaintiff has to show he is "an intended beneficiary of the statute, his interests
are not vague, and the statute imposes a binding obligation on the state.").
21

22Id.
23 Id. at 1363.
24 42 U.S.C. § 651-669(b) (1996).
"Title IV-D generally requires each
participant State to establish a separate child support enforcement unit 'which
meets such staffing and organizational requirements as the Secretary may by
regulation prescribe.'" Blessing, 117 S. Ct. at 1356 (quoting 42 U.S.C. §
654(3) (1996)).

2
Id.
26

id.
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paternity, to locate absent parents, and to help families obtain and
enforce support orders.27
The plaintiffs in this case were families from Arizona who were
eligible for these services. 2' They alleged, in broad terms, that
Arizona was doing a poor job complying with the federal
statutory scheme. 29 Their claim was that they had a right to have

Arizona substantially comply with this federal statute. 30 They did
not invent this "substantial compliance" standard. That phrase
was in the federal statutes and regulations. 3 It was the standard
that would place a state at risk of losing federal funds if, in fact,
it was not in "substantial compliance" with the federal statutes.32
The plaintiffs claimed that Arizona's record of performance
under this federal statute was very poor as a result of

caseworkers' high case loads, staffing inadequacies and backlogs,
poor record keeping, and so forth.33 But the Supreme Court
unanimously held that Title IV-D did not give the plaintiffs
enforceable rights to compel substantial compliance by state
government.34

Id. The Court stated that in order to qualify for federal funds, the state
was required to certify that it would operate a child enforcement program that
conformed to the requirements set forth in Title IV-D. Id. The State was
required "to do so pursuant to a detailed plan that has been approved by the
Secretary of Heath and Human Services." Id. Moreover, the State was
required "to do more that simply collect overdue support payments; it must
also establish a comprehensive system to establish paternity, locate absent
and help families obtain support orders." Id.
parents,
28 1d. at 1357.
29 1d. at 1358.
27

30 Id.

See 42 U.S.C. § 609(a)(8) (1996) (authorizing the Secretary of Health &
Human Services to reduce a state's grant by up to 5% if the state does not
"substantially comply" with the requirements of Title IV-D).
32 Id. Blessing, 117 S. Ct. at 1357.
33 Id. at 1358. See 42 U.S.C. § 654(3) (1996). Section 654(3) provides "A
state plan for child and spousal support must.., provide for the establishment
or designation of a single and separate organizational unit, which meets such
staffing and organizational requirements as the Secretary may by regulation
prescribe, within the State to administer the plan." Id.
14 Blessing, 117 S. Ct. at 1361.
31
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I think that this decision is important for two reasons. The first
one might strike you as being a little on the ironic side. I think
this decision is important because it didn't make any changes in
the principles or doctrines utilized by the Supreme Court to
determine the enforceability of federal statues under Section
1983. In other words, the Supreme Court analytical framework
remains the same. Now, why is that significant? Well, in this
area, which I would term an area of "legal instability," we have
had Supreme Court decisions going in different directions, every
single term seems to bring a new mode of approach from the
Supreme Court. It thus seems significant that stability reigns, at
least for the moment.
Why do I say "at least for the moment?" Because in footnote 3
of the Court's opinion35 we learn that the State of Arizona had
asked the United States Supreme Court to overturn its 1980
decision in Maine v. Thiboutot.3 6 That was the case that started

the development of the law in this area. It was Thiboutot that
held that federal statutes, and not just federal civil rights statutes,
are generally enforceable under Section 1983.1' The Supreme
Court in Blessing said that the continuing validity of Blessing had
not been dealt with by the lower courts. 8 Because of that, the
Supreme Court refuse to address this issue.3 9 That means that
this issue may be on the horizon in the future, and that is
something to look for.
I think the decision in Blessing v. Freestone is also important for
the attorneys actually involved in litigating these issues. The
Supreme Court in Blessing stressed that a Section 1983 plaintiff
who seeks to enforce a federal statute under Section 1983 must
show that the particular federal statutory provision meets the test

11 Id. at 1359 n.3 (stating that petitioners asked the Court to overrule
Thiboutot, where the Court held that § 1983 provides a remedy for violations
of any federal statutes).
36448 U.S. 1 (1980).
3 Id. at 4 (holding that the Section 1983 remedy "broadly encompasses
violations of federal statutory as well as constitutional law.").
8Blessing, 117 S. Ct. at 1359.
39
1Id. at 1361.
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of enforceability.40 It is not sufficient for plaintiffs to talk about
the federal statutory scheme in general. So when plaintiffs go
into federal court and allege that Arizona has not been operating
its Title IV-D program in "substantial compliance" with the
Social Security Act AFDC child support provisions, the Supreme
Court responded by saying that the plaintiff's claim was much too
general. 4' The plaintiffs painted with too broad of a brush.

Plaintiffs have an obligation to point to particular provisions in
that particular federal statutory scheme, and then demonstrate that
those particular federal statutory provisions are enforceable under
Section 1983.42
The Court did say that these may be some particular federal
statutory provisions in Title IV-D that are enforceable under

Section 1983. 43 That issue, however, had not been presented to
the Supreme Court. What are we going to do with that? So the
Court remanded that issue to some unlucky federal district court
judge who will have to deal with that question.44
Let us move to the second question, the question of municipal
liability. When is a municipality liable under Section 1983 for
the wrongs of its employees? Starting with the landmark decision
' Id. at 1359. The Court looks at three factors when determining whether a
statutory provision gives rise to a federal right. Id. "First, Congress must
have intended that the provision in question benefits the plaintiff." Id.
"Second, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the right assertedly protected by
the statute is not so 'vague and amorphous' that it's enforcement would strain
judicial competence." Id. "Third, the statute must unambiguously impose a
binding obligation on the States." Id.
" Id. at 1362. The Court specifically stated that "it is not at all apparent that
respondents sought any relief more specific than a declaration that their 'rights'
were being violated and an injunction forcing Arizona's child support agency
to 'substantially comply' with all of the provisions of Title IV D." Id.
42

Id.

Id. The Court discussed three principles that determine whether a
particular statutory provision gives rise to a federal right that may be
enforceable under § 1983. Id. (1) Congress intended that the provision in
question benefit the plaintiff; (2) plaintiff must demonstrate that the right
assertedly protected by the statute is not so vague and amorphous that its
enforcement would strain judicial competence; (3) the statute must
unambiguously
impose a binding obligation on the state. Id. at 1359.
44
41

Id.
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in Monell v. Dep't of Social Services,45 what we learn is that,
unlike the normal common law tort principle of vicarious
liability, there is no vicarious liability, no respondeat superior
liability in Section 1983 law.' That winds up meaning that a
municipality can only be held liable under Section 1983 for its
own wrongs. What do we mean by "its own wrongs?" That
means that the municipality can only be held liable when the
violation of the plaintiff's federally protected rights is attributable
to the enforcement of some type or municipal policy or practice.
But the big issue that the Supreme Court and lower courts have
been struggling with since the decision in Monel 7 is what type of
municipal policies and practices give rise to Section 1983
liability? Let me suggest that if we tried to figure out what the
present Supreme Court decision of law is, there are four potential
types of municipal policies or practices. Let me run through
them to have a framework in order to understand the Supreme
Court's municipal liability decisions of last term.
First of all, there could be a formally promulgated written
policy. For example, it could be an ordinance adopted by the city
council. That is the easy case. Second, which actually turns out
to be a lot more difficult, is that it is possible for the municipal
liability to be based on the final decision of a municipal
policymaker. 4' Third, even though unwritten, we might have a
municipal practice or custom that could serve as a basis for
municipal liability. 9 Finally, the Supreme Court has held
specifically that municipal liability can be based upon a showing
45 436 U.S. 658 (1978). This case involved a class action suit brought by
"female employees of the Department of Social Services and the Board of
Education of the City of New York." Id. at 660. The complaint alleged that
pregnant employees were forced to "take unpaid leaves of absence before such
leaves were required for medical reasons." Id. at 661. The Court held that
local governments are not wholly immune from suit under § 1983. Id. at 690.
46 Id. at 691. The Court stated that "[w]e conclude that a municipality
cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor, or . . . a
municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior
theory." Id.
47 d. at 658.
" See Schwartz, sipranote 4 at § 7.15.
49 See Schwartz, supra note 4 at § 7.16.

TOURO LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 14

that the municipality was deliberately indifferent in the way that it
trained its employees." So these are the four potential modes of

establishing municipal liability.
Last term, there were two Section 1983 municipal liability cases
decided by the Supreme Court. The first is Board of County
Commissioners of Bryan County v. Brown51 and the second is
McMillian v. Monroe County. 2 They are both five to four
decisions;5 3 I think it is significant that both of these decisions
were rendered in favor of the municipalities.54
Let me discuss the Brown case first.55 Brown came about as a
result of a confrontation between Jill Brown and deputy sheriff
Burns.5 6 Burns was involved in pursuing an automobile that was
driven by Jill Brown's husband. Jill Brown was a passenger in
the car.5 8 They came to a stop point and Deputy Burns said to Jill
Brown, "out of the car. 59 When she did not get out of the car
right away, the deputy grabbed her and put an "arm bar" hold on

' See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989) (holding that
"inadequacy of police training may serve as a basis for § 1983 liability only
where the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of
persons with whom the police came into contact."). See Schwartz, supra note
4 at § 7.17.
51 117 S. Ct. 1382 (1997).
52 117 S. Ct. 1734 (1997).
5' Brown, 117 S. Ct. at 1382. Justice Souter, Justice Stevens, Justice Breyer,
and Justice Ginsburg dissented. Id. at 1386. The same four justices dissented
in McMillian. See McMillian v. Monroe County, 117 S. Ct. 1734 (1997).
' Brown, 117 S. Ct. at 1382. See also McMillian, 117 S. Ct. at 1736.
51 Brown, 117 S. Ct. at 1382.
56
id. at 1386.
5 Id.
" Id. Jill Brown and her husband were driving from Texas to their home in
Oklahoma. Id. In order to avoid a checkpoint in Oklahoma, the Brown's
turned away and drove back to Texas. Id. After seeing the Brown's truck
drive away, the County Deputy and Reserve Deputy pursued the Brown's
truck. Id.
59 Id.
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her. 60 He threw her out of the car and spun her to the ground,
and she was seriously injuredJ
Jill Brown then brought a Section 1983 action in federal court
and sought to establish liability on the part of Deputy Burns.62
That is a personal capacity claim. But the issue before the
Supreme Court came about because she also sought to establish
liability on the part of the county that hired deputy Burns.' How
did the deputy get hired? Well, the deputy was hired by the
sheriff, Sheriff Moore, and the county stipulated in the Supreme
Court that, for the purpose of running the Sheriff's Department,
the sheriff is the policymaker of the county.( There wasn't an
issue on that score, but what was the plaintiff's theory of
municipal liability?
The plaintiff argued that that when Deputy Burns was hired, the
sheriff did a type of deficient background check.6 It turns out
the deputy was the son of the sheriff's nephew.6 You might have
a hard time figuring out what the relationship was there, but there
was a little nepotism. And maybe as a result of this little
nepotism, I don't think we know for sure, the sheriff in fact
obtained the deputy's criminal record, but hired him anyway.' It
is not the greatest thing for a law enforcement officer to have a
criminal record. He had a series of traffic infractions and
misdemeanor convictions for assault and battery, resisting arrest,
and public drunkenness.68 That was the deputy's record. The
sheriff who hired him acknowledged that he obtained the criminal
record, but really didn't look at it very carefully. 69 The county
6 id.

at 1386-87. The "arm bar" technique involved grabbing Jill Brown's
arm at the elbow and wrist, pulling her from the truck and then spinning her to
the ground. Id.
61Id.

62 Id. at 1387
6 id.

6 Id. at 1389.
6 Id. at

1387.

6Id.

6 Id.
63 Id. at 1393.
69 Id.
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must have had some suspicion about deputy Bums because, while
they did hire him and gave him the authority to make arrests, it
would not let him have a gun, nor would they let him have a
patrol car.70 Some law enforcement officer!
The county must
7'
right?
fellow,
this
about
doubts
its
have had
The plaintiff's theory of liability went something like this:
Didn't the Supreme Court hold in City of Canton v. Harris7 that
deliberately indifferent training could give rise to municipal
liability?73 Of course, the answer to that is "yes." If that is so,
how about deliberately indifferent
hiring or deliberate
74
indifference in the screening process?
Let me say a word about these inadequate training cases. There
are huge numbers of inadequate training municipal liability claims
asserted under Harris. I didn't do a statistical work-up, but I can
tell you that the plaintiffs prevail in a very tiny percentage of
these cases. It is very difficult for the plaintiffs to prevail. I
would say that it is under one percent, and that is being generous
to the plaintiffs.
Why is it tough for the plaintiffs to prevail? Well, first of all,
deliberate indifference is a tough standard to satisfy. That is for
starters. The other reason is that it is very hard for plaintiffs to
show direct causation between what the plaintiff claims is
inadequate training and the plaintiffs deprivation of a federally
protected right. For those two reasons, inadequate training
claims are the type of claims on which plaintiffs very infrequently
prevail.
The Supreme Court in the Brown case said, in effect, "You
think training claims are tough?75 Screening claims are even
tougher." 7 6 It is going to be tougher for the plaintiff to prevail on
70 1d.

at 1387.

71Id.
72 489 U.S. 378 (1989).
71Id. at 387. The Court

stated that inadequacy of police training may serve
as a basis for § 1983 liability in "limited circumstances." Id.
7 Brown, 117 S. Ct. at 1389-90.
75ld. at 1390-91.
76 Id.
The Court reasoned "[W]here a plaintiff presents a § 1983 claim
premised upon the inadequacy of an official's review of a prospective
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a claim of deficient hiring because the plaintiff has to show not
that the hiring authorities were deliberately indifferent to the
applicant's employment record, but rather that they were
deliberately indifferent to the plaintiff's federally protected
rights. 7 Again, the levels of culpability and of causation are very
stringent.
The way the Supreme Court spelled it out is that a plaintiff who
presents such a case has to show a strong likelihood that this
employee, the employee who was hired, would engage in this
particular type of constitutional wrongdoing.78 I think that, if this
is not an impossible standard for plaintiffs to satisfy, it is pretty
close to impossible. It makes me wonder whether the Supreme
Court might have done everybody a better service by just
rejecting this theory of liability altogether. Once you have a
standard and leave the theory of liability open, plaintiffs are
going to assert these claims, and they are typically fact-laden
claims that are very time-consuming. But the reality is, how
many plaintiffs are going to be able to meet this standard? The
language that the Court used is that the plaintiff has to show that
the particular employee who was hired- and here is the language"would inflict this particular injury suffered by the plaintiff." 79
Go ahead and try to prove it.
In theory, the Brown decision is a case involving an
interpretation of Section 1983.' ° But my own view is that
realistically, this case has very little to do with the meaning of
Section 1983. Why do I say that? This was a five-to-four
applicant's record... there is a particular danger that a municipality will be
held liable for an injury not directly caused by a deliberate action attributable
to the municipality itself." Id. at 1391.
'n Id. at 1393.
78 Id. at 1392. The Court inquired as to whether a review of Bum's record
would have revealed that the sheriff should have known that Burns use of
excessive force would have been a "plainly and obvious consequence of the
decision to hire him." Id. The Court concluded that there was insufficient
evidence to find that the sheriff's hiring decision reflected a "conscious
disregard of an obvious risk that a use of excessive force would follow." Id.
at791393.
id.

o Id. at 1387-88.
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decision. 8 Who is in the majority? Well, the more conservative
members of the Supreme Court are in the majority: the Chief
Justice and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas,
with the more liberal and moderate justices in the dissent.82 I
don't think that is just an accident. I don't think that is one of
those funny coincidences.
I think that, underlying the specific issue in the Brown case, is
the issue of federalism. 3 To what extent should the federal
courts review municipal hiring decisions? Do you think that it is
just another funny coincidence that this is the same five-member
majority that held the Brady handgun bill unconstitutional," has
given us a broad interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment
protecting states' rights, 85 and has cut back on the Congressional
commerce power.86 I doubt it. I think that this decision is in line
with those cases that are cutting back on federal power and
returning power to state and local government.8 7 I think that is
going to be one of the themes of the conference today.
To the extent that this case is about the meaning of Section
1983, I think that one way to look at the Brown decision is that
municipal liability claims just get too close to the forbidden
respondeat superior law basis of liability.88 What do I mean?
8" Id. at

2

1386.

Id.

83 id.

' Printz v. U.S., 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997). Justices Souter, Breyer, Stevens,
and Ginsburg dissented. Id. The act at issue established a "federal scheme
governing the distribution of firearms." Id. at 2368. The court held that
Congress does not have an implied power to "impress the state executive into
succession." Id. at 2365.
85 U.S. CONST. amend. XI. This amendment states: "The Judicial power of
the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of
any Foreign State." Id. See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 116 S.Ct.
1114 (1996).
86 See U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding that The Gun Free
School Zone Act, a statute making it a federal offense to knowingly possess a
firearm in a school zone, did not have a substantial impact on interstate
commerce, and thus, was an improper exercise of Congressional power under
the Commerce Clause).
' Brown, 117 S. Ct. at 1386.
88Id.
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Certainly in the Brown case, the plaintiff can't go into court and
say that Bryan County should be held liable because it hired this
deputy and made a bad choice - because it hired a deputy who
turned out to be a constitutional wrongdoer. The plaintiff can't
make that claim. Why not? Because that is "respondeat

superior" liability.
So what does the plaintiff say to the Supreme Court? What does

Jill Brown say? Jill Brown argues, "well, that is not my claim.
My claim is not just that they hired this person that they should
not have hired, but that when they hired Deputy Bums, the
county was deficient with respect to perusal of Bum's criminal
record."

89

Well, I think that the Court may well be saying that

that is just too close to respondeat superiorliability.
The other municipality liability decision, McMillian v. Monroe
County, deals with a different type of municipal liability claim.'
The Supreme Court has held that municipal liability can be based
on a single decision of a municipal policymaker.91 The key issue
in these cases is whether the municipal official has final decisionmaking authority.' The Supreme Court holds that this is an issue
that is to be resolved as a matter of state law. 93 An issue is
89 Id.

at 1387.
90 117 S. Ct. 1734 (1997). McMillian's capital murder conviction was
reversed on the grounds that the State of Alabama had concealed evidence of
McMillian's innocence. Id. at 1736. Thereafter, McMillian brought a § 1983
lawsuit against Monroe County, Alabama, and other officials, including the
Sheriff of Monroe County. Id. In his complaint, McMillian alleged that the
Sheriff, acting in his official capacity as an official of Monroe County, violated
McMillian's constitutional rights by intimidating a witness into making false
statements and suppressing exculpatory evidence. Id.
9 Id. The Court concluded that "a local government is liable under § 1983
for its policies that cause constitutional torts. These policies may be set by the
government's lawmakers, 'or by those edicts or acts may be fairly said to
represent official policy. '" Id. (quoting Monell v. Dep't of Social Services,
436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)).
9 Id.
93 Id. at 1737. The Court stated that "[olur inquiry is dependent on an
analysis of state law." Id. The Court reasoned that "our understanding of the
actual function of a governmental official, in a particular area, will necessary
be dependant on the definition of the official's function under relevant state
law." Id.
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whether the municipal official is a municipal policymaker or state
policymaker. That has come up, for example, with respect to
district attorneys for the various counties of New York. The
Second Circuit decisional law holds that even though they work
within the county, when they prosecute crimes they are not
municipal policymakers, but are state policymakers.9 4 In the
McMillian case, the Supreme Court, by a five-to-four vote, 95 the
same alignment as in the Brown case, 96 held that Alabama sheriffs
are state policymakers, not county policymakers. 9' If an official
is a state policymaker, there is no basis for imposing municipal
liability. And, presumably, if the official is a state policymaker,
that means the Eleventh Amendment comes into play. Now, if I
were giving out awards for different types of decisions, maybe
Brown would get last terms "most important Section 1983
decision" award, McMillian would get the award for "the most
unusual Section 1983 case for last term.
Why do I say that? Because if one compares the majority and
dissenting opinions in McMillian, there is no disagreement among
the justices as to the meaning of Section 1983. There is not even
a disagreement as to the methodology for approaching the
policymaking issue.98 The majority and the dissent agree that the

issue should be resolved by reference to state law. 99 So here you
have a five-member majority and four-member dissent in the
Supreme Court disagreeing about what Alabama state law is."O
That is strange.
9 See, e.g., Walker v. City of New York, 974 F.2d 293 (2d Cir. 1992);
Eisenberg v. District Attorney of County of Kings, 1996 WL 406542
(E.D.N.Y.); Covington v. City of New York, 916 F. Supp. 282 (E.D.N.Y.
1996); Baez v. Hennessy, 853 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1988); Gentile v. County of
Suffolk, 926 F.2d 142 (2d Cir 1991).
95McMillian, 117 S.Ct. at 1735. Justices Ginsburg, Stevens, Souter, and
Breyer dissented. Id.
96 117 S.Ct. 1382 (1997)
97McMillian, 117 S.Ct. at 1739 (stating Alabama sheriffs, when executing
their law enforcement duties, represent the State of Alabama, not their
counties).
98 Id.

99 Id. at 1742 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
100Id.
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Five members of the Supreme Court say, "well, you know the
Alabama Constitution and Alabama Supreme Court decisional
law, and the Eleventh Circuit decisional law, all treat Alabama
sheriffs as state policymakers as a matter of state law." o The
majority took a formalistic approach, while the dissenters took a
more real-life pragmatic approach. They said, "wait a second.
Sheriffs in Alabama are hired by the county, are paid by the
county, and have their equipment furnished by the county. And
they only have jurisdiction within the county." 0 As a colleague
of mine at Suffolk Law School, Karen Blum,10 said, the dissent's
position is - if it looks like a duck, walks like a duck, and quacks
like a duck, it should be a duck. But not4 for the majority. The
majority held that they are state officials.'0
There is an important dissenting opinion written by Justice
Breyer in Brown in which he stated that the whole subject of
Section 1983 municipal liability has become so convoluted and so
refined that it is impossible to apply."° In his view the court
should rethink this whole issue. I would say that if you can't
follow analysis of the municipal liability decisions, you would
probably agree with Justice Breyer, because this has become a
very difficult area. Now, we have the distinction between
training claims and hiring claims. We have decisions in which
101Id.

at 1740.

102 Id. at 1743 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (stating that "Alabama has 67
county sheriffs, each elected, paid, and equipped locally, each with
countywide, not statewide, authority.").
103 Karen Blum is a professor at Suffolk Law School in Massachusetts, who
made this statement at the Federal Center Section 1983 Training program for
Federal District Court Judges, and Magistrates in Denver, Colorado in August
1997.
14McMillian, 117 S. Ct. at 1740. In rendering its decision the Court relied
on among other things, the State of Alabama's Constitutional provisions
regarding Sheriff's, the historical development of these constitutional
provisions and the State Supreme Court's interpretation of these provisions.
Id. The Court concluded that the Sheriff's represent the State, not the county,
when acting in their official capacity. Id.
105 Brown, 117 S. Ct. at 1401 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating that the
decisional law has created a set of such complicated guidelines that "the law
has become difficult to apply.").
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the Supreme Court wrestles five-to-four as to whether the official
is a state policymaker or a county policymaker?' ° Four justices
are indicating that perhaps we should now adopt vicarious
liability. 107
Let me go to the third issue - qualified immunity. Qualified
immunity is clearly, I think, the most prevalent issue in Section
1983 litigation. It protects officials who are sued for monetary
liability under Section 1983, so long as the official did not violate
clearly established federal law.108 An official who violates clearly
established federal law is not protected by qualified immunity. 9
It is called "Harlow-Anderson immunity," after the leading
cases.110 But, if you violated the plaintiff's federal rights and the
federal law wasn't clearly established, then the official is
protected from personal liability by this immunity."'
This immunity is special in two ways. First, the Supreme Court
holds that qualified immunity gives the official not only immunity
from liability, but also immunity from having to defend the
lawsuit at all.11 2 When I first heard this, it seemed very aberrant.
Immunity normally meant protection from liability, but the
official would have to defend the lawsuit. But, qualified
immunity is an immunity from the burdens of litigation, not just
from liability. And it is unique in a second way. If a federal
district court denies qualified immunity raised on a motion for
summary judgment, the official normally has the right to take an
immediate appeal from the denial of immunity to the circuit court
of appeals. 1 It is an exception to the final judgment rule." 4
'oSee McMillian, 117 S. Ct. at 1736.
107Id. at 1743.
11 See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). The Court held
"officials performing discretionary functions, generally are shielded from
liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known." Id. at 818. See also Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S.
635 (1987).
109 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
11 See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818. See also Anderson, 483 U.S. at 646.
"'Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
112 Id. at 808. See also Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 US 511 (1985)..
11 See Richardson v. McKnight, 117 S. Ct. 2100 (1997).
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There were three cases decided by the Supreme Court last term
that could be called "qualified immunity" cases. One is Clinton
v. Jones, but I don't really believe that it raises recurring issues
for Section 1983 cases. 1 5 As much as I would like to talk about
Paula Jones and President Clinton, I'm going to resist and turn
my attention to the immunity decisions that raise more recurring
Section 1983 issues.
The first is Richardson v. McKnight,"6 and it arose out of the
fact that prisons in different parts of this country are now being

privatized. The Prison Corporation of America, for example,
runs many of the prisons in Tennessee."' In Richardson, the
Supreme Court held that private prison guards who are sued
under Section 1983 for constitutional violations cannot assert the
Harlow qualified immunity defense. This was yet another five to
four decision."'
The broad issue that underlies Richardson is, what happens
when the private party defendant is found to be a state actor?" 9

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60. See also Blessing v. Freestone, 117 S. Ct. 1353
(1997).
The respondent brought a § 1983 action to
115 117 S. Ct. 1636 (1997).
recover damages from the President based on allegations of certain sexual
advancements, which allegedly led to retribution by her supervisors in her state
job. Id. at 1637. The Court held that "[dieferral of this litigation until
petitioner's Presidency ended was not constitutionally required." Id. at 1638.
116 117 S. Ct. 2100 (1997).
In Richardson, an inmate at a Tennessee
action against prison guards, who were
§
1983
a
brought
Correctional Center,
corporation, for physical injuries
management
prison
employees of a private
inflicted by the guards. Id. at 2102. The prison guards asserted a qualified
immunity defense to the prisoner's claim. Id. The Court held that prison
guards employed by a private corporation, are not entitled to the qualified
immunity from a § 1983 claim. Id.
117 Id. at 2102. The Court reasoned that "history does not reveal a 'firmly
rooted' tradition of immunity applicable to privately employed prison guards."
Id. at 2104. Moreover, the court stated that the purpose of the immunity
doctrine does not warrant qualified immunity for prison guards who are
privately employed. Id. at 2106.
"I Id. Justices Breyer, Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, and Ginsburg formed the
majority. Id. Justices Scalia, Rehnquist, and Thomas dissented. Id.
1 9 Id. at 2103.
14
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Can the defendant raise the qualified immunity defense?12 The
defendant would argue that: "you are treating me as a state actor,
why don't you give me the same immunity defense that you give
to public official state actors." 121 That is, "if I have the burdens
of litigation, why don't I get some of the benefits of it?"' 22 The
Supreme Court in Richardson did not deal with that broad
issue." This is a limited holding, in the sense that the Supreme
Court made clear that it applies only to private prison guards.' 24
So the broad issue remains on the table.
The decision reads like it comes from the school of law and
economics. Justice Breyer's focus is upon the economic aspects
of the way private prison companies and private prison guards
operate." The decision leaves a number of issues open. Let me
explain. The Prison Corporation of America, which hired the
private guards in Richardson, was clearly a for-profit
organization.' 26 One issue that is left open is the immunity of
private party state actors who work for not-for-profit
organizations which perform services for state or local
government?
Secondly, there was in Richardson very limited supervision of
these private guards by the government. 27 That leaves open the
question, as to whether the issue would come out differently if
these prison guards were carefully supervised by the
government?128 Another issue was left open: The Court held that
private prison guards cannot assert qualified immunity,' but
maybe they are entitled to assert some other type of good faith
120 Id.
121

Id. at 2106.

122 Id.
" Id. at 2102. The Court framed the issue as follows: "[W ] hether prison

guards who are employees of a private prison management firm are entitled to
a qualified immunity from suit by prisoners charging a violation of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983." Id.
124 Id. at 2108.
125 Id. at 2104-06.
126 Id. at 2106.
127Id. at 2108.
128 Id.
129

Id.
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defense. 3 0 That is an open issue too. These issues are all open.
Remember, this is a five-to-four decision. 3 ' The presence of any

of these factors might tip the holding in the other direction.
The most important issue left open in the Richardson case is

whether private prison guards are engaged in state action.,"

The

Supreme Court said, for purposes of this litigation, we are going

to assume that private prison guards are engaged in state action,
but we are not resolving the issue. 3 3 So, this issue is an open
issue as well.
The other immunity case is Johnson v. Fankell.134 Remember
that in federal court an official who is denied qualified immunity

normally can take an immediate appeal to the Court of Appeals. 35
Well, in Johnson, the Supreme Court said that the right of
immediate appeal does not exist in a state court 1983 action.' 36
Why is this significant? In all prior decisions that the Supreme
Court has rendered in dealing with state court Section 1983
action, the Court has taken the position that the very same rules
that apply in a federal court Section 1983 action should also apply

in a state court Section 1983 action.' 37
There was a principle of parity that was developing. Johnson
marks the first time that the United States Supreme Court has
See also Wyatt v. Cole, 928 F.2d 718 (5th Cir. 1991).
Richardson, 117 S. Ct. at 2102.
132 Id. at 2108.
'3 Id. The Court specifically stated that it would not determine whether the
"defendants acted under color of state law." Id.
1 117 S.Ct. 1800 (1997). In Jolnson a liquor store clerk brought a §1983
action for damages, alleging deprivation of property "without due process of
law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment" when officials of the Idaho
Liquor Dispensary fired her. Id. at 1802.
131See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 524 (1985) (holding that "a
Federal District Court order rejecting a qualified immunity defense on the
grounds that defendant's actions would have violated clearly established law
may be appealed immediately.").
" Johnson, 117 S.Ct. at 1807. In Johnson, state officials claimed they
were entitled to qualified immunity. Id. at 1802. After the trial court rejected
their defense, the officials argued that they were entitled to an interlocutory
appeal. Id.
I" See Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989);
Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131 (1988); Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356 (1990).
'-1

131
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held that a different rule may apply in a state court Section 1983
action as compared to a federal court Section 1983 action. 3 8 The
specific holding was that in a state court Section 1983 action there
is no federal right to an interlocutory appeal from the denial of
qualified immunity. 139 Of course, if the state chooses to give a

right of interlocutory appeal, there is nothing wrong with that,
but there is no federal right to take the interlocutory appeal. 40
This might prompt some plaintiffs to file their Section 1983
claims in state rather than a federal court. On the other hand, it
also might prompt some defendants in state court Section 1983
actions to attempt to remove the action to federal court. If an
official in a state court Section 1983 action doesn't have the right
of interlocutory appeal, she might try to remove to federal court
where she has the right to an interlocutory appeal.
I'm up to my last area, the fourth area, which is the relationship
between the Section 1983 federal and state remedies. This is an
area where the Supreme Court decided two cases last term.'41 Let
me give you a little background first. The Supreme Court has
consistently told us since the decision in Monroe v. Pape that one
does not have to exhaust state remedies in order to file suit under
Section 1983."' The Court, in keeping with that principle, has
Johnson, 117 S. Ct. at 1807. The Court held that "when preemption of
state law is at issue, we must respect the principles of federalism" and respect
the State's application of its procedural rules. Id.
138

139Id.

140Id.

See Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 117 S. Ct. 1659 (1997).
This case involved an allegation of a "regulatory taking" of property. Id. at
1662. The issue to be decided was whether the claim of a constitutional
violation was ripe for judicial review. Id. at 1664. The Court held that the
claimant had obtained a "final judgment" sufficient to meet the Williamson
ripeness test. Id. at 1670. See also Edwards v. Balisok, 117 S. Ct. 1584
(1997). This case involved an alleged § 1983 violation for deprivation of due
process during the course of a disciplinary proceeding that resulted in a state
prisoner's loss of his good time credits. Id. at 1586. The Court held that the
claim was "not cognizable under the Section." Id. at 1589.
142 365 U.S. 167 (1961) (holding that the "federal remedy is supplementary
to the state remedy, and the later need not be first sought and refused before
the federal one is invoked.").
141
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consistently held that the federal Section 1983 remedy is
independent of any available state remedies.1 3 But I think, little
by little, the Supreme Court and the Congress have been cutting
into this principle. 14 Certainly, they have been paying more
attention to the issue.
One of the useful roles of a law professor is to take seemingly
isolated Supreme Court decisions and attempt to put them
together. Maybe the busy practitioner doesn't have time to do
that. So here I do succumb to temptation. Let me try to put

those pieces together as quickly as possible.
In 1981, the Supreme Court decided Parratv. Taylor,145 holding
that a procedural due process claim arising out of random and
unauthorized state action could be defeated by the availability of a

post-deprivation state judicial remedy.

6

The availability of an

adequate post-deprivation state judicial remedy thus can defeat the
Section 1983 due process claim. 47 This is not an exhaustion rule,
but a principle of procedural due process, yet Parratis a doctrine
under which the state judicial remedy can wind up defeating the
federal Section 1983 claim.1

Similarly, in 1985, the Court decided a major case dealing with
regulatory takings claims. In Williamson Regional Planning v.

143
See, e.g., Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 489 (1994) (holding "we do
not44engraft an exhaustion requirement upon § 1983.").
I Id. The Court in Heck held that a prisoner challenged the constitutionality
of her conviction or sentence § 1983 if the conviction or sentence is first is
overturned.
145 451 U.S. 527 (1981) (presenting the question of whether a state prisoner
can recover for damages under § 1983, alleging a violation of due process
when hobby materials that the prisoner ordered had been lost as a result of the
prison officials negligence).
14 Id. at 544. The Court held "[A]lthough the state remedies may not
provide respondent with all of the relief which may have been available...
that does not mean that the state remedies are not adequate to satisfy the
requirements of due process." Id.
47
Id. The State of Nebraska had a torts claim procedure by which a person
'
who suffered a tortious loss at the hands of the State can seek redress for the
deprivation. Id. at 543.
4 Id.
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Hamilton,149 the Court held that when the plaintiff files a Section
1983 regulatory takings claim, the plaintiff has to show that she
sought just compensation through state procedures. 50
In
addition, he or she must show an attempt to obtain a final
decision concerning the permissible uses of the property.'
This
decision too is not couched in exhaustive terms; it is couched in
ripeness terms."' But the availability of state remedies can serve
to defeat Section 1983 takings claims. In a very high percentage
of cases, the Section 1983 plaintiff is not able to meet the
Williamson ripeness test.
There was a case on this issue last term from the Supreme
Court, Suitum v. Tahoe Regional PlanningAgency. 5 3 The Court
held that a plaintiff who asserts a regulatory takings claim does
not have to show that, if he or she has, a what are called
"transferable development rights," that the agency approved the
54
sale of those rights.
Now, maybe I should backtrack just a bit. The landowner in
the case did obtain a final decision denying her application for a
building permit.151 In a final decision denying her application for
a building permit, the local authorities made a decision that her
property fell into an environmental zone that did not allow for
149473

U.S. 172 (1985).
15o Id. at 200. In Williamson, a land developer brought a § 1983 action,
alleging that the Planning Commission had taken its property without just
compensation by refusing to approve the developer's proposed developments
of a tract of land. Id. at 175. The Court held that "[b]ecause respondent has
not yet obtained a final decision regarding the application of the zoning
ordinance and subdivision regulations to its property, nor utilized the
procedures Tennessee provides for obtaining just compensation, respondent's
claim is not yet ripe." Id. at 186
' Id. at 191 (holding that until the Planning Commission decides that the
requested variances will not be granted, it is impossible for the jury to
determine whether the respondent "will be unable to derive economic benefit"

from the tract of land).
152

Id. (stating that effect cannot be measured until a final decision has been

made as to how the regulations will be applied to respondent's property).
'5
'5
's

117 S. Ct. 1659 (1997)
Id. at 1661.
Id. at 1663.
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development.' 6 The Court held that this was a final decision
concerning her right to use the property.' She had been given,
under state law, transferable development rights.S She had the
right to transfer those rights, but she had to get agency approval
for the transfer."5 9 I think the main point of the decision was that
those transferable development rights are something valuable.
Whether a particular transfer or sale is approved or not, she still
has them, 16° and they are something of value.16 1 My reading of
this decision is that, it is limited to this specific issue dealing with
transferable development rights. I don't think that it seriously
diminishes the Williamson ripeness rules.
Let me come to the third way in which state remedies are
playing important roles in Section 1983 litigation. In 1994, the
Supreme Court decided Heck v. Humphrey," which was an
exceedingly important decision. Heck holds that any time the
plaintiff asserts a claim that necessarily implicates the
constitutionality of a conviction or sentence, the claim is not
cognizable, unless the plaintiff shows the federal court that the
conviction or sentence has been overturned in some way."3 It
could be overturned either on appeal in state court, or by habeas
156 id.
'5 Id. at 1667. The Court held that "it is undisputed that the agency has
finally determined that petitioner's land lies entirely within an SEZ (Stream
Zone)." Id.
Environment
158

Id.

159m.

160

Id. at 1670. The Court held "her only challenge to TDR's [transferable

development rights] raises a question about their value. . . ." Id.
161Id.
162

512 U.S. 477 (1994). In Heck, Roy Heck was convicted of voluntary

manslaughter and sentenced to a 15-year prison sentence. Id. at 478. While

his appeal was pending, he filed suit under § 1983 against the Dearborn
County prosecutors and Indiana State police investigators, alleging that the
defendants "acting under state law" engaged in unlawful acts which led to his
arrest and conviction. Id. at 499.
1 Id. at 486-87 (holding "the plaintiff must prove that the conviction or
sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order,
declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or
called into question by a federal court's issuance of a write of habeas

corpus.").
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corpus proceeding, or by executive order. 1" I think that this is a
type of exhaustion requirement.
Last term, in Edwards v. Balisok, 165 the Supreme Court
extended Heck to prison disciplinary sanctions, specifically, to
challenges by prisoners who assert that the sanction violates
procedural due process rights. 66 The Heck doctrine applies, and
this is an important proviso, if the plaintiff's procedural due
process claim, if successful, would necessarily lead to the
invalidation of the disciplinary sanction."
The prisoner in
Edwards claimed that the hearing officer was biased and deceitful
and didn't allow the prisoner to put on a defense. 6 The Court
said that the claim was not cognizable in federal court under
Section 1983, unless the prisoner first showed that the
disciplinary sanction had been overturned. 69 It is a type of
exhaustion requirement, and to me, this is the Section 1983
sleeper of the year. You heard it here first.
This decision is going to lead to the dismissal of large numbers
of prisoner Section 1983 cases. It is also going to create a lot of
difficulty for federal judges, because they are going to have to
sort out which procedural due process claims necessarily
implicate the validity of the disciplinary sanction and which do
not.
Now for the last piece of the puzzle in the relationship between
the federal Section 1983 remedy and state remedies. Congress
has gotten into the act too. Congress now says that a prisoner
who seeks to contest the conditions of confinement must first
exhaust available administrative remedies. 70 So, I think, when
you look at this whole picture, I do not think it is now safe to say
164
Id.

"6"117 S. Ct. 1584 (1997).
'6 Id. at 1589 (holding "respondent's claim for declaratory relief and money
damages, based on allegations of deceit and bias on the part of the
decisionmaker that necessarily imply the invalidity of the punishment imposed,
is not cognizable under § 1983.").
167 Id.

16 Id.

Id.
17042 U.S.C. § 1997(e) (1994).
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